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POPULAR AUTHORSHIP AND CONSTITUTION MAKING:
COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE DRC AND KENYA
JAMES THUO GATHII*
INTRODUCTION
African countries have produced a torrent of new constitutions
since 1989.1 In addition to these new constitutions, there has been
an exponential growth of nongovernmental organizations monitor-
ing compliance of African governments with the new constitutional
requirements.2 What is more striking is that constitution making in
countries like Kenya involved the most widespread discussion
among ordinary citizens, outside of nongovernmental groups. In
many countries with new constitutions, vigorous discussions on the
need for a commitment to and compliance with the rule of law and
respect for human rights "infus[es] the capillaries of everyday life"
in a manner unimaginable in the repressive political climate of two
decades ago.3
* Governor George E. Pataki Professor of International Commercial Law, Albany Law
School. This Article was written before the December 2007 general elections in Kenya that
were followed by a spate of violence. It remains to be seen whether the mediation talks
between the Government and the opposition led by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan will produce a new constitution. If this happens, then it will show once again how
much easier it is to have significant constitutional reforms following a crisis.
1. 1 counted at least twenty-five new constitutions and many more that were amended
in Africa to allow plural politics in the World Fact Book. See CIA, The World Factbook,
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbooklindex.html (last
visited Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter World Factbook].
2. See, e.g., U.N. Directory of African NGOs, http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/ngodirectory/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008) (listing NGOs by country or action area).
3. See John L. Camaroff & Jean Camaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An
Introduction, in LAW AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1, 24-26 (Jean Comaroff & John L.
Comaroff eds., 2006); see also Rosalind C. Morris, The Mute and the Unspeakable: Political
Subjectivity, Violent Crime, and "the Sexual Thing" in a South African Mining Community,
in LAw AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 57, 57-101, supra.
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In conflict-ridden countries, constitutions have come to symbolize
a commitment to make a complete break with the past.4 This means
in the DRC, a break from Mobutuism; in Uganda, a break from the
legacy of Idi Amin; in South Africa, a break from apartheid;5 in
Eritrea, a break from the repressive constraints of Ethiopia; and so
on. The use of a constitution to symbolize a break from the past was
aptly dramatized by the South African Constitutional Court in its
very first decision.' According to the court in a subsequent decision:
The South African Constitution ... represents a decisive break
from, and a ringing rejection of, that part of the past which is
disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and repressive and
a vigorous identification of and commitment to a democratic,
universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos,
expressly articulated in the Constitution. The contrast between
the past which it repudiates and the future to which it seeks to
commit the nation is stark and dramatic.'
Yet notwithstanding the commitment to make a complete break
with the past, some continuity with the conflicts of the past and of
repressive authoritarian practices has been evident in countries as
diverse as Uganda, the DRC, and Ethiopia. Although symbolizing
the effort to break with the past, constitutions in several countries,
4. See Ugo Mattei, Paper Presentation at the International Conference on African
Constitutions: Patterns of African Constitutions in the Making (Nov. 27, 1998), available at
http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Constitutional/Mattei-1999/Patterns.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2008) (arguing that the constitutions of Ethiopia, South Africa, and Eritrea were
"responses to genuine revolutionary moments").
5. See, e.g., Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) 8
(S. Aft.), available at http://hei.unige.ch/-claphamhrdocdocs/soobramoney.pdf. The court
observed that:
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of
people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high
level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access
to clean water or to adequate health services. These conditions already existed
when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to
transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom
and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order.
Id.
6. See Constitutional'Court of South Africa: The First Hearing, http://www.concourt.
gov.zasite/thecourt/history.htm#judgment (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
7. S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 262 (S. Afr.) (discussing the constitutionality
of the death penalty).
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including the DRC and Uganda, have also legitimized-through
electoral processes-political leaders who were once warlords. The
DRC, which has witnessed the birth of two new constitutions in the
last five years,' is a good example of a country that continues to
experience disorder, lawlessness, and war alongside its new
constitution. By contrast, the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya
has survived a complete overhaul following several years of
constitutional drafting, redrafting, and minimal amendments.9
Eventually, a new constitution was rejected in a referendum in
November 2005 following a broadly consultative, participatory, and
contentious drafting process.' ° This is all expected to change
sometime in 2008, however, following the eruption of violence in the
wake of the disputed election at the end of 2007. A political
settlement being debated will require major constitutional reforms.
The constitution-drafting process and its approval in the DRC
was a significant part of a peaceful political solution to war. As such,
the constitution as a charter limiting the authority of the executive
and separating power between the branches of the government was
not a primary motivation for the adoption of the constitution.
Rather, in this Article I argue that the 2005 Constitution was seen
as symbolizing a break from the past, and that the people of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo seized a rare opportunity to end
the wars in their country by overwhelmingly adopting a constitution
that they had not participated in writing.
In both Kenya and the DRC, constitutional drafting was domi-
nated by the incumbent parties. Interestingly, in Kenya, where
there was more widespread discussion of the drafts, the constitution
was resoundingly defeated in the referendum of 2005.1" By compari-
8. See World Factbook, supra note 1, at Congo, Democratic Republic, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publicationsthe-worldfactbooklgeos/cg.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
9. See James T. Gathii, Kenya's Legislative Culture and the Evolution of the Kenya
Constitution, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 78-93 (Yash Vyas et al. eds.,
1994). In Njoya v. Attorney General, (2004) 1 K.L.R. 261, 286 (Kenya) (discussed infra note
112), Justice Ringera noted that "[s]ince independence, there have been thirty-eight (38)
amendments to the Constitution. The effect of all these amendments was to substantially
alter the Constitution. Some of them could not be described as anything other than an
alteration on the basic structure or features of the Constitution."
10. See Alicia L. Bannon, Note, Designing a Constitution-drafting Process: Lessons from
Kenya, 116 YALE L.J. 1824, 1830-41 (2007) (describing the movement for a new constitution,
the review process and drafting, and the unsuccessful referendum vote).
11. See id. at 1840-41.
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son, the much less widely discussed 2005 DRC Constitution was
approved by an overwhelming 84 percent in a referendum. 2 This
contrast may arise from the fact that constitution drafting in post-
conflict nations like the DRC during internationally supported
transitions is likely to be dominated by incumbent leaders but,
nevertheless, be widely approved. On the other hand, countries not
experiencing significant conflict exhibit more political openness, but
may experience difficulties in the approval of a constitution limiting
the power of an incumbent government in a referendum. It may
very well be that when people "find themselves with all the time
they need to find a good solution, no solution at all may emerge,"'3
as the Kenyan experience so far seems to suggest. By contrast, the
dueling parties in the DRC conflict literally had their backs against
the wall, and although the constitution drafting process commenced
in a manner that did not allow popular authorship, the urgent need
to address the longstanding conflicts in the country accounts for the
overwhelming approval in a referendum of the 2005 Constitution.
4
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I examine the factual
background to constitution making in the DRC and Kenya. In Part
II, I compare and contrast questions of constitutional legitimacy,
validity, and efficacy in the constitution-making processes of the
DRC and Kenya. I end with the conclusion that whereas in Kenya
widespread participation and consultation resulted in voting down
the constitution, in the DRC minimum participation did not affect
its overwhelming approval.
12. For an excellent discussion of the DRC Constitutional Referendum of 2005, the official
results broken down by province, drafts of the DRC Constitution, and links to the relevant
constitutions, documents, and agreements (many of which are in the official French language
text), see DR Congo-Constitutional Referendum, Posting of Renee Dopplick to Inside Justice,
http://www.insidejustice.com/law/index.php/nt/2005/12/21/dr-congcnewconstitution (Dec.
21, 2005, 18:36 EST) [hereinafter DR Congo-Constitutional Referendum Discussion].
13. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-making Process, 45 DUKE L.J.
364, 394-95 (1995).
14. On how urgency may inform constitution making, see id.
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I. BACKGROUND TO CONSTITUTION MAKING IN THE DRC AND KENYA
A. Constitution Making in the DRC
The writing and promulgation of the DRC's new constitution was
provided for by international agreement; the new constitution
replaced the transitional constitution enacted on April 4, 2003,
which arose from the Pretoria Agreement."5 The Pretoria Agreement
provided for ending the five-year war in the DRC and also called for
a constitutional referendum and national elections within three
years, with the possibility of two six-month extensions.16 Under this
agreement, a new constitution was to be written and promulgated,
and national elections were to be held by the end of July 2006."7
The constitutional commissions that drafted the 2003 transitional
constitution were appointed by President Kabila.18 This followed an
agreement on March 11, 2003, among parties to the inter-Congolese
dialogue, to begin a program for the drafting of the new constitution
and for a future unified army.19 The transitional constitution and
army were to last for a period of a national transitional government
eventually leading to national democratic elections-which eventu-
ally were held in July 2006.20 Drafting began soon after and was
finalized by the Congolese Constitutional Commission in October
2004 after a high-level European Union official flew to Kinshasa to
dissuade President Kabila from endorsing an authoritarian
21
constitution. 1 It was finalized at a retreat in Kisangani in October
15. See DR Congo-Constitutional Referendum Discussion, supra note 12. The agreement
is also known as the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC, signed
on December 17, 2002, in Pretoria, South Africa. See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. Security
Council, Secretary-General Hails Pretoria Agreement as Political Milestone for Peace in
Congolese Conflict, U.N. Doc. SC/7479 (Aug. 8, 2002).
16. See Press Release, U.N. Security Council, supra note 15.
17. See DR Congo-Constitutional Referendum Discussion, supra note 12 (discussing the
transitional constitution, voter registration, and drafting the referendum).
18. See Congo Chronicle XI (Oct. 27-Nov. 9, 1997), available at http://www.congoned.dds.
nllchroni 1.html.
19. See id.
20. See DRC-Belligerents Agree on Constitution, Unified National Army,
NEW AM. MEDIA, Mar. 11, 2003, available at http://news.newamericamedia.orgnews/
viewarticle.html?article_id=fc2ea699e8d34e90ac021dc79148952e (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
21. See DR Congo-Constitutional Referendum Discussion, supra note 12.
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2004.22 The constitution was thus drafted in approximately 1.5
years.2 Only the larger political parties were represented in the
commission and participated in the drafting of the new con-
stitution,24 indicating that there was little widespread discussion of
the draft. In fact, to the extent there was consultation, it appeared
that the views of the people were ignored. For example, a Senate
committee prior to the enactment of the constitution found wide-
spread opposition to the death penalty, but the senators ignored
these public views and inserted provisions allowing the death
penalty for certain offenses.2"
The DRC drafted the constitution with the assistance of
France, Mauritius, Belgium, and the United States.26 International
organizations also assisted in the drafting process, including the
Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA),27 the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation (KAF),28 USAID,29 UNDP,3 ° and the United Nations
office in the DRC.3  The U.S.-based National Democratic Institute
22. See id.
23. For a brief overview of this process, see Report for the Mission in Democratic Republic
of Congo (Oct. 25-Nov. 4, 2004), available at http://cnapd.beLCNAPD1.1/DocATelecharger/
rapport%20mission %20rdc%2025%20oct%205%20nov%2020041.htm (article title and text
translated from French by author). For an argument that popular consultation was not
necessary in the DRC, see Pdp6 Mikwa, Constitution: Congolese Want a Unitarian State,
SYFIA GRANDS LACS, AGENCE DE PRESSE, Jan. 20, 2005, http://syfia-grands-lacs.info/index.
php5?view=articles&action-voir&idArticle=351 (article title and text translated from French
by author). On acrimony among the writers and senators drafting the constitution, see Draft
of DRC Constitution Adopted in the Senate, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 17, 2005, available
at http://www.peinedemort.org/document.php?choix=1303 (article title and text translated
from French by author).
24. The Independent Electoral Committee (CEI), the committee charged with conducting
the elections, only included representation from the major political parties. See First Carter
Center Pre-Election Statement on Preparations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (June
6, 2006), http://www.cartercenter.orgtnews/documents/doc2374.html.
25. See DRC: "The National Asembly Can Still Abolish the Death Penalty," AFRIK.COM,
Apr. 6, 2005, http://www.afrik.com/article8259.html (article title and text translated from
French by author).
26. See DR Congo-Constitutional Reform Discussion, supra note 12.
27. See id.; see also EISA Homepage, http://www.eisa.org.zal (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
28. See DR Congo-Constitutional Reform Discussion, supra note 12; see also Konrad
Adenauer Foundation: Philippines, http://www.Kaf.ph/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
29. See DR Congo-Constitutional Reform Discussion, supra note 12; see also U.S. Agency
for International Development, http://www.USAID.gov/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
30. See DR Congo-Constitutional Reform Discussion, supra note 12; see also U.N.
Development Programme, http://www.undp.orgt (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
31. See U.N. Mission in DR Congo, http://www.monuc.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).
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for International Affairs (NDI) supplied technical support in addi-
tion to recommending changes to the draft constitution.32 The
Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church, joined by
USAID, developed and distributed a precursor draft of the new 2005
draft constitution.33
As the first step toward enactment, the draft constitution was
presented to the Senate and the President of the Chamber of
Parliament on October 29, 2004.3' The draft was then adopted by
the DRC transitional parliament-known as the National Assembly
-on May 13, 2005, and submitted to the popular referendum. 35 The
referendum was held on December 18-19, 2005.36 According to
official results, 84 percent of voters approved the constitution, which
was officially promulgated on February 18, 2006. 3' The country's
first national democratic elections in over forty years took place a
few months later, on July 30, 2006.8
The constitutional referendum and subsequent national elections
were widely considered procedurally successful. Before the referen-
dum, the Independent Electoral Committee (CEI) circulated over
500,000 copies of the proposed constitution-about one for every
fifty voters. 39 Additionally, the constitution was not translated into
all spoken Congolese languages, including Kingwana, a broadly
spoken dialect of Swahili.4 ° As a result, despite their awareness of
the campaign, many voters were unaware of the constitution's
content. Many voters, however, relied on the Kabila-led transitional
government's assurances of social improvement.4'
32. See DR Congo-Constitutional Reform Discussion, supra note 12; see also National
Democratic Institute, http://www.ndi.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
33. See DR Congo--Constitutional Reform Discussion, supra note 12.
34. See id.
35. See id. This process was in accordance with Article 104 of the transitional constitution.
The text of the Constitution of the DRC is available in French at: http://www.presidentrdc.cd/
constitution.html.
36. See DR Congo-Constitutional Reform Discussion, supra note 12.
37. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
38. See id.
39. See DR Congo-Constitutional Reform Discussion, supra note 12.
40. See id.
41. See id.
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B. Constitution Making in Kenya
The debate on reforming the Kenyan Constitution started in
earnest in the late 1980s and peaked in the early 1990s. The
authoritarian governance of the Moi regime and its tinkering with
the constitution against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War,
coupled with dramatic changes in Eastern and Central Europe, gave
impetus to calls for a constitutional overhaul to end one-party rule.
An amendment to the constitution in 1982 making Kenya a one-
party State was often cited as a clarion call for immediate change.42
In 1986, another amendment made by the one-party parliament
removed the security of tenure from the offices of the Attorney
General and the Controller and Auditor General.43 The Moi
government argued in support of removing these protections on
grounds that they were colonial hangovers with no place in modern
Kenya." Further justification for overhauling the constitution was
an amendment in 1988 extending the power of the police to hold
suspects in capital cases without charges for fourteen days.45 Most
importantly, this amendment removed the security of tenure for
judges of the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Public
Service Commission.46
Following heavy criticism, the parliament reversed course and in
1990 returned the security of tenure to the members of the Public
Service Commission and judges of the Court of Appeal and High
Court, as well as the Attorney General, Controller, and Auditor
General. 47 Finally, under heavy pressure from civil society groups
-particularly lawyers, the bishops of the Catholic Church, the
Hindu Council of Kenya, the Supreme Muslim Council of Kenya
(SUPKEM), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the
National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), and donors-the
one-party parliament in December 1991 ended the de jure one-party
status the ruling party had enjoyed since 1982.48 The end of one-
42. See Bannon, supra note 10, at 1830-32.
43. See Gathii, supra note 9, at 87.
44. See id. at 89.
45. See id. at 90.
46. See id. at 100.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 92-93.
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party rule began a new but unconcluded phase of overhauling the
constitution. The 1992 multi-party general elections exhibited the
continuing vitality of the independence party, the Kenya African
National Union (KANU), which had clung to power because multi-
party politics were conducted within the authoritarian strictures of
a one-party constitution with an especially powerful and unaccount-
able president. This state of affairs resulted in an opening for a new
constitution to be implemented through a people-driven process.49
In 1997, the Moi government acquiesced to the enactment of the
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act (the Review Act),
which was negotiated by an Inter-Party Parliamentary Group.5 ° The
appointment of the Review Commission by the Moi government
without consulting opposition parties or other stakeholders,
however, undermined its image as a representative body. l As a
result, between June and October 1998, negotiations began in
earnest between the Review Commissioners and a civil society
group, the Ufungamano Initiative, which had established the
People's Commission of Kenya (PCK)."2 A consensus between the
two groups in 2001 resulted in an amended law to facilitate
constitutional review that combined the Moi appointed commission-
ers with those of the Ufungamano Initiative. 3 The review team
49. See Bannon, supra note 10, at 1830-32.
50. In 1997, general elections were held. Similar to the 1992 elections, the 1997 elections
were preceded by constitutional amendments. These amendments were the result of the Inter-
Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) negotiations reflecting a consensus around a set of
minimum-rather than comprehensive-reforms to balance the electoral playing field and
give opposition parties more political room. These amendments included an agreement on a
more independent electoral commission. See generally WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-
MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVL SOCIETY AND TRANSITION POLITICS IN KENYA, 1992-1997
(1999). For other accounts and analysis of constitution making in Kenya, see THE ANATOMY
OF BOMAS: SELECTED ANALYSIS OF THE 2004 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (Kithure Kindiki
& Ososo Ambani eds., 2005); INFORMING A CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT: ESSAYS ON
CONSTITUTION REFORM IN KENYA (Morris Odhiambo, Osogo Ambani & Winnie V. Mitullah
eds., 2005).
51. See Mutunga, supra note 50, at 217 (discussing characteristics that would make a
Commission "independent and impartial" according to Kenyan cultural norms).
52. For more on the Ufungamano Initiative, including how it structured its commissioner
selection process and its critique of the "anti-people" government, see ANNE MURAGU NYABERA
ET AL., SETTING THE PACE: THE 1999/2000 FIDA ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF
KENYAN WOMEN (2000); see also Athena D. Mutua, Gender Equality and Women's Solidarity
Across Religious, Ethnic, and Class Differences in the Kenyan Constitutional Review Process,
13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 44 (2006).
53. See Laurence Juma, Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya,
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consulted the public widely, collated their views, and came up with
a draft constitution (called by many the "Zero Draft").54 The Zero
Draft was preceded by the Commission's efforts in widespread civic
education, visits to all electoral constituencies to listen to and collect
views, receipt of over 35,000 written memoranda, and the availing
of information on the constitution in district documentation centers
throughout the country.55
In spite of these efforts, President Moi scuttled the con-
stitution-making process just before the 2002 elections by dissolving
Parliament. He did so prior to the meeting of the National Constitu-
tional Conference that was required to discuss and then adopt or
reject the draft constitution.56 The 2002 elections ousted the ruling
party from power and brought to power a coalition of opposition
parties.57 The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party promised
to deliver a new constitution within one hundred days after its
December 2002 inauguration. 5' There was, therefore, optimism in
the air when the review process was reconvened in 2003.
The National Constitutional Conference was an unwieldy
assembly of over 600 members composed as follows: all 223
members of Parliament; 210 representatives of districts elected by
county councils; 29 members of the Review Commission as non-
voting members; 41 persons each representing a political party; 12
representatives of religious, professional, and women's groups; trade
unions; nongovernmental organizations; and other interests selected
by the Review Commission.59
Though the Conference was very inclusive, there were many rifts
within it. For example, problems existed between parliamentarians
and the rest of the conference delegates, 60 between members of the
9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 471, 524-26 (2002).
54. See CONSTITUTION OF KENYA REVIEW COMM'N, NAT'L CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE,
DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2004 (Oct. 20, 2004), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc
438024/bomas-draft-2004.
55. See THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE: REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA REVIEW COMM'N
4 (Sept. 18, 2002) [hereinafter THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE].
56. See Bannon, supra note 10, at 1834.
57. See id. at 1835-36.
58. See id. at 1835.
59. See THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE, supra note 55, at 2.
60. See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Republic of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the
Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
15, 180 (2004).
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ruling NARC coalition party, which began to disintegrate over the
2002 post-election power-sharing arrangements,61 and so forth.
These disagreements resulted in judicial challenges to the role of
the National Constitutional Conference. This Article will discuss
these challenges in greater detail in relation to issues of legal
validity in the next Part. Suffice it to say here, one of the conten-
tious issues in the review was whether the National Constitutional
Conference or Parliament had the power to enact a new constitution
to replace the preexisting constitution. 2
As a result of the legal challenges to the competence of the
National Constitutional Conference, the Constitution of Kenya
Review Act was amended to provide for a referendum as the
appropriate manner to enact a new constitution. 6' This amendment
reflected the outcome of the legal skirmishes to the effect that the
people of Kenya had the constituent power to enact a new constitu-
tion.64 Following this amendment to the Review Act, Attorney
General Amos Wako amended the draft constitution that emerged
from the National Constitutional Conference (NCC).65 These
amendments to the NCC draft were agreed upon by parliamentari-
ans in meetings in Naivasha and Kilifi.66 These amendments
reflected the controversy over whether Parliament or the NCC had
the last word on the draft of the constitution.67 The result of these
amendments, known as the Wako Draft, was then submitted to a
referendum in November 2005.68 The draft constitution was
defeated by a 58 percent vote against it; only 42 percent of those
voting in the referendum would have approved it. 69
61. Id.
62. See infra Part II.B.
63. See generally Bannon, supra note 10.
64. See id.
65. See PRESTON CHITERE ET AL., KENYA CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 4 (2006), available at http:/www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2367=Kenya-consti-
tutional-documents.
66. Id. at 1, 4.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 4.
69. See Kenya's Verdict: Orange Triumphs, E. AFR. STANDARD (Kenya), Nov. 22, 2005,
available at http://www.eastandard.nettarchives/?mnu=details&id=32558&catid=4; see also
Michael Ole Tiampati, Maasai-led Grassroots Education Efforts Prove Essential to
Referendum Defeat, WORLD INDIGENOUS NEWS, Feb. 8, 2006, available at
http://www.cs.org/publications/win/win-article.cfm?id =2840&highlight=.
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Raila Odinga, a leading opposition politician who advocated
against the Wako Draft, noted in an editorial that "seven out of
eight provinces and 152 out of 210 constituencies voted for the same
cause. And for the second time in three years, Kenyans have
inflicted heavy political defeats on the governments of the day."7 °
Odinga was referring to a major by-election a few months before in
which the ruling NARC party lost seats in Parliament.71 The defeat
of the Wako Draft was in striking contrast to the NARC Coalition
electoral victory in 2002, when President Kibaki led the party with
support from all over the country.72 Barely three years after NARC's
electoral victory, deep ethnic divisions emerged in the country, as
reflected in the referendum vote.73 Only Central Kenya, which is
predominantly Kikuyu and the same ethnic group as President
Kibaki, overwhelmingly voted for the draft constitution, while most
of the rest of the country rejected it.74
The rejection of the draft constitution demonstrated how well
organized the opposition, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM),
had become since splitting from the NARC coalition.75 Not all the
arguments that ODM politicians used to lobby for the defeat of the
Wako Draft accurately reflected its contents, however. For example,
they misled their supporters on what the draft constitution provided
for on the very controversial subjects of inheritance by girls of their
father's property, as well as on religious courts and, in particular,
Islamic courts.76
70. Raila Odinga, Editorial, President Learnt Little from Poll Defeat, DAILY NATION
(Kenya), Dec. 6, 2005.
71. For more information about opposition leader Odinga, see Bannon, supra note 10, at
1835-36.
72. See Makumi Mwagiru, Issues, Problems, and Prospects in Managing the Diplomatic
Services in Small States, FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF., Winter 2006, at 193 (noting that
"[t]he NARC government rode to power on the back of an overwhelming Vote of Confidence").
73. See generally Bannon, supra note 10.
74. See Njoroge Kinuthia, AAGM Kenyans Reject Proposed Constitution, DAILY NATION
(Kenya), Nov. 22, 2005; Francis Soler, President Kibaki Plays His Last Card, INDLAN OcEAN
NEWSL., Nov. 26, 2005.
75. See Kinuthia, supra note 74.
76. See Michael Chege, Weighed Down by Old Ethnic Baggage, Kenya Races to Another
Historic Election, CSIS AFR. POLY FORUM (June 22, 2007), http://forums.csis.org/ africa? p=40
("In practice, the referendum was won by the ODM's skillful exploitation of other issues: fears
of violation of ethnic land rights among pastoralists by a proposed land commission; cultural
and sexist antipathy to the supposedly un-African idea enshrined in the draft constitution of
equal inheritance rights between sons and daughters; appeals to Muslims, who felt short-
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The defeat of the Wako Draft was also regarded as a verdict
against the foot dragging of the Kibaki administration, particularly
in fighting high-level corruption.77 Most important, the defeat of
the constitution showed how polarized the country had become,
particularly between the Kikuyu of the Central Province and the
rest of the country. 7 Although the NARC government had come to
power representing ethnic groups from around the country, its
support--especially in Nyanza, most of the Rift Valley, the Coast
and Western provinces-has since ebbed away significantly.79
Finally, the defeat of the Wako Draft is evidence that in Kenya,
the constitution has continued to be a political football passed
between those vying for political power and those defending it.
s8
From this point of view, there seems to be no genuine commitment
to having a constitution to lay down a general framework for
governance among the political class in the country. The art of
compromise and coalition politics that had characterized the
original NARC in 2002 seems to have given way to political
divisions, which reflect a deepening of ethnic politics as politicians
postured for the 2007 election.
Several efforts by President Kibaki's government to restart
constitutional reform talks since November 2005 have not produced
much progress. His appointment of the Kiplagat Panel of Eminent
Persons came up with a report calling for "national healing," but
this and its other recommendations were not implemented ahead of
the controversial elections of December 2007.1 In that election ODM
changed by the absence of tough constitutional guarantees for their traditional kadhi courts
77. See, e.g., Kenyan Constitution Vote Is Referendum on Leadership, USA TODAY, Oct. 20,
2005, at 10.
78. See Soler, supra note 74.
79. See Chege, supra note 76 ("In November 2005, the government lost the constitutional
referendum by a decisive 57 to 43 percent vote. Kibaki accepted the verdict. But the results
polarized the country on ethnic lines, with the bedrock of the government's support being
confined largely to heavily Kikuyu Nairobi and central Kenya, the Kikuyu heartland to the
north of the capital.").
80. See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on
an African Political Paradox, in STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALIsM: AN AFRICAN DEBATE ON
DEMOCRACY 3, 6-19 (Issa G. Shivji ed., 1991) (exploring this theme at greater length).
81. Otiende Amollo, The Committee of Eminent Persons: Saviour or Pawn?, E. AFR.
STANDARD (Kenya), May 1, 2006, available at http://www.eastandard.net/archives/index.
php?mnu=details&id=l 143951793&catid=4.
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pushed for minimum constitutional reforms to level the political
playing field.82 One observer summarized the stakes in the latest
round of constitutional reform proposals by noting that proposals to
form a consultative assembly, "a grander version" of the National
Constitutional Conference, "will surely end up as a noisier Tower of
Babel ... [and] we cannot spend all our time talking and arguing
about a constitution that will never be."83 Given the political crisis
and violence that followed the 2007 presidential election, however,
the Kofi Annan-led mediation talks ongoing as of mid-February
2008 between ODM and the government promise the best chance for
constitutional, political, and institutional reforms as one part of
resolving the crisis.
II. LEGITIMACY, VALIDITY, AND EFFICACY IN CONSTITUTION
MAKING IN THE DRC AND KENYA
A few years ago, David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg argued
that the reality of conflict-ridden, poverty stricken countries "pre-
dispose[d] one to reconstitute power by authoritarian and coercive
means."' In other words, they argued that "massive developmental
change [was] extremely difficult to realize under acceptable political
conditions."85 Is it plausible to make the case that the drafting and
adoption of the 2005 DRC Constitution is consistent with Apter and
Rosberg's thesis-that strong-arm rule may be acceptable to
reconstitute political authority after a major conflict? If so, what is
the fate of constitutionalism when a constitution is adopted by
excluding popular participation in its drafting, and it is nevertheless
82. See Makau wa Mutua, Why Minimum Constitution Reforms Don't Make Sense, DAILY
NATION (Kenya), Sept. 21, 2006 (arguing that "[mlinimum constitutional reforms are now
being supported by people who opposed comprehensive constitutional reform under Moi").
According to Mutua, "Mr Kalonzo Musyoka, Mr William Ruto, Mr Mutula Kilonzo, Mr Henry
Kosgey, and Mr Musalia Mudavadi stood in the long struggle for a democratic constitution.
These men stood steadfastly with the Moi-Kanu regime as it brutally persecuted reformers."
Makau Mutua, AAGM: Yesterday's Villians Are Today's Heroes, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Sept.
13, 2006.
83. Gitau Warigi, Calling Timeout on Endless Talks, SUNDAY NATION (Kenya), Sept. 17,
2006. For a comprehensive examination of the review process, see Bannon, supra note 10.
84. David E. Apter & Carl G. Rosberg, Changing African Perspectives, in POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW REALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1, 39 (David E. Apter & Carl
G. Rosberg eds., 1994).
85. Id.
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adopted overwhelmingly in a referendum? Is constitution drafting
of an entirely new constitutional document only possible under
conditions of political, economic, and social turbulence as the DRC
experience shows? How different are the constitutions accepted in
return for independence in the post-independence era from those
adopted in countries like the DRC as a transition from war to peace?
Does drafting constitutions for peace suggest as one of the outcomes
less of an assurance for a homegrown constitution? These are the
questions I seek to address in this part of the Article.
A. Legitimacy and Efficacy
The approval of the DRC Constitution undermines the classical
understanding that constitutions are inaugurated in a constitu-
tional moment representing a radical break with the past.86 This
is consistent with the fact that few constitutions live up to the
mythical notion of a transforming revolution." It is also consistent
with the widely accepted proposition that impoverished regimes do
not consolidate democratic regimes very well.88 This is especially
true where democratic transitions have primarily involved the
establishment of political institutions without simultaneously
addressing the socio-economic basis of instability.8 9 The over-
whelming approval of the 2005 DRC Constitution in a referendum,
especially in the war-torn Eastern provinces, suggests that war
wariness, more than widespread public involvement in the drafting
of the constitution, accounted for its high approval rating. So even
86. See AndrA Saj6, Remarks on Constitution Making and Amending (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.cpbae.nccu.edu.tw/tra/CRND/papers/panel2_1.pdf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2008) (arguing that only the United States in 1789, Belgium in 1830, and
South Africa came close to this ideal of a truly transformative constitution).
87. See id.
88. See generally TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY
(Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead eds., 1986).
89. Commentators have argued that "the essence of democracy is that the allocation of the
costs and benefits of reform is the subject of bargaining among competing groups. Sometimes
such bargaining is inefficient and fails to produce economically optimal outcomes, which
makes it tempting to limit or defer the democratic control of policymaking." Stephan Haggard
& Steven B. Webb, Introduction, in VOTING FOR REFORM: DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL
LIBERALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 1, 31 (Stephan Haggard & Steven B. Webb eds.,
1994). For a critical view, see WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION,
U.S. INTERVENTION AND HEGEMONY 344 (1996).
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while war continued in parts of the DRC, the constitution was
regarded as important enough to the country's transition from war
to receive widespread public approval. This experience undermines
the view that people are more likely to approve a constitution
because they were involved in drafting it or because the people who
enacted it had title to do so.90
A high approval rating of a constitution, however, may not
predict its efficacy,9 especially where conditions of war continue.
In addition, although a high approval rating of a constitution may
point to its legitimacy or its public acceptance, especially in
heralding the return of peace after war, such a constitution does
not approximate well to the desire for an autochthonous or
indigenously-generated constitution.92 In fact, it is paradoxical that
new constitutions like the 2003 DRC Transitional Constitution are
adopted with significant backing of an internationally negotiated
and supported peace process eerily similar to the involvement of
departing colonial powers in the adoption of post-independence
constitutions.93
Clearly then, although seeking an autochthonous constitution
with widespread public participation in its drafting and approval is
an important goal, the DRC experience shows that seeking to draft
a constitution on a clean slate to make a complete break with an
undesirable past carries forward some of that past. For example, the
warring parties become part of the government or the opposition. 94
The past that is sought to be superseded invariably frames a new
constitutional order one way or another.
The DRC experience raises another challenge. Whereas the
importance of popular sovereignty and political self-government in
90. For a discussion of these modes ofconstitutional bindingness, see Frank I. Michelman,
Constitutional Authorship by the People, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1605 (1999).
91. By efficacy, I am referring to the empirical question of following the commands and
restrictions of the constitution. See id. at 1616 (discussing constitutional normative authority).
92. See, e.g., J.B. Ojwang, Autochthony, Nationhood and Development: A Review Article,
2 AFR. URB. Q. 454, 454-57 (1987); see also Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 528, 528-32 (1999) (arguing that constitutions in failed states are best built "from
the bottom up").
93. See Isaak I. Dore, Constitutionalism and the Post.Colonial State in Afric: A Rawlsian
Approach, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1301, 1302-06 (1997) (describing "constitutional failure" in
certain African countries from the beginning of its existence up to the contemporary era).
94. See Michelman, supra note 90, at 1628 (arguing that in such circumstances "political
interactions ... were already framed, when they occurred").
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determining constitutional legitimacy cannot be overstated, the
efficacy of a new constitution is not solely dependent on the actual
involvement of the people in its drafting and/or acceptance.95 By
efficacy, I mean the extent to which the constitution forms the basis
for predicting political behavior and sanctioning office holders for
violating it.96 To argue that legitimacy arises from popular drafting
alone is to inaccurately suppose that legitimacy similarly predicts
the efficacy of a constitution.
B. Legal Validity
Besides efficacy and legitimacy, concerns about the legal validity
of a newly drafted constitution often arise. These questions may
arise when there is a preexisting constitutional order, such as in
Kenya. The legal validity of a newly drafted constitution, particu-
larly in commonwealth African countries, is assumed to be necessar-
ily traceable to another norm-the preexisting constitution. In
essence, it is presupposed that the constitution itself contains its
ultimate "rule of recognition" or acceptance."7 Tracing the validity
of one constitution to another ignores whether the preexisting, or
indeed newly drafted, constitution has legitimacy or efficacy.
Consequently, one must also pay attention as much to the process
of making or approving the constitution as to the reasons besides
participation in drafting and/or approving it that factually demon-
strate that it is indeed binding or efficacious.
This Article's claim is that another way in which the forcefulness
of a constitution may be established-in addition to or in place of its
authorship by the people-is its acceptance in fact9" by the people
and the political leadership in at least two senses. First, efficacy can
be traced by examining whether the constitution constrains the
power of political leaders. Second, in multi-ethnic societies like
Kenya, the efficacy of a constitution may arise by examining the
extent to which it helps establish a political environment that
encourages the emergence of inter-ethnic political alliances, political
moderation and cooperation, and minority accommodation, with a
95. See id. at 1616-19.
96. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
97. See Michelman, supra note 90, at 1616.
98. I am heavily influenced and persuaded by Frank Michelman. See id. at 1617-19.
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view to de-emphasizing cleavages along destabilizing axes such as
ethnicity or religion.9" Constraining ethnic divisiveness will in turn
contribute to the success and endurance of a constitution. A
successful constitution is, in part, one that is self-enforcing. 100
The foregoing analysis suggests that it is perhaps more important
to ask whether the 2005 DRC Constitution has efficacy by looking
at how the citizens and their leaders behave in relation to it, rather
than by only examining those who enacted or approved it. Kenya's
debate on whether the people or the Parliament were the ultimate
bearers of the right to approve the Wako Draft in November 2005 is
also instructive on the question of what makes a constitution legally
binding-its authorship and approval by the people in the National
Constitutional Conference, on the one hand, or by Parliament, on
the other. The question of where the authority to approve the Wako
Draft lay was part of the larger and equally divisive debate in the
country regarding whether the National Constitutional Conference
was truly as representative as a constituent assembly would have
been. 1 ' This Kenyan debate, therefore, acutely raised the crucial
question: who is the "constitutional subject" eligible to draft a new
constitution? °2
The Kenyan High Court was asked to decide whether Parliament
or the people in a referendum were eligible to approve a constitution
drafted and negotiated by the National Constitutional Conference
in the case of Onyango v. Attorney General, also know as the Yellow
99. Here I follow Paul Brass when he argues that "political accommodation in democratic
societies is an art not a system, and one that has to be pursued persistently in the face of
changing circumstances." PAUL R. BRASS, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM: THEORY AND
COMPARISON 342 (1991). Brass argues that "[c]onsociationalism is a device for freezing
existing divisions and conflicts and reducing the art of political accommodation to formulas
that can work only as long as processes of social, economic, and political change do not upset
them." Id.; see also Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers, in
CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES 115, 122 (Joseph V. Montville ed.,
1990) (noting that a "device that creates incentives for cooperative interethnic relations" is
one of the mechanisms of managing ethnic divisions in a democratic setting).
100. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul ...
Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1139 (2008) (arguing that
to be enforceable, a constitution must be self-enforcing).
101. See MUTUNGA, supra note 50, at 217 (discussing representative characteristics in
Kenyan culture).
102. See generally Saj6, supra note 86, at 6 (arguing that a discussion of who represents
"constitutional subject" is a "dangerous public discussion").
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Movement case.' The case pitted those who argued that the process
established to rewrite the Kenyan constitution should be people-
driven against the Attorney General's view that it was the preroga-
tive of Parliament under the existing constitution to approve a new
constitution.14 The Attorney General's position was that the legal
validity of the new constitution could only be established by another
norm: the constitution that was sought to be replaced, as well as by
parliamentary legislation concerning the modalities of exercising a
parliamentary mandate.105 Although both sides of the debate
represented opposing political elites, the framing of the debate as
one between authorship by the people and authorship by the
Parliament raises the question once again: what makes a constitu-
tion binding? Both sides of the debate in Kenya-people-driven
through a referendum preceded by a popularly elected constituent
assembly versus parliamentary approval-were informed by the
narrow question regarding where to locate agency or legal title to
make the constitution legally binding. Neither of these opposing
sources of the bindingness of the constitution were centered on
factual or other circumstances that might have contributed to the
actual efficacy or effectiveness of any resulting constitution.0 6
Counsel for the people-driven view "exhorted" the court to make
it possible to have a "people friendly constitution and deliver our
people from the current mine-field of constitution making,"
107
referring to the acrimonious and litigious nature of the drawn-out
process of constitution making that had started several years
earlier.0 8 Counsel further argued that the mandate or power to ap-
prove the draft constitution produced by the National Constitutional
Conference resided with the people, rather than Parliament,
because "Constitution making is not a legislative process" and thus
103. Patrick Ouma Onyango et al. v. Att'y Gen., (2005) eKLR 1 (Kenya), available at
http://kenyalaw.org/eKLR (click "Case Search" tab; then enter "Patrick Ouma Onyango" in
"Case Parties" box).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. It is, however, fair to presuppose that each side imagined that their method of
approval guaranteed a better chance for the efficacy of the approved constitution.
107. Onyango, (2005) eKLR at 18-19.
108. For various accounts of constitution making in Kenya, see MUTUNGA, supra note 50;
Makau Wa Mutua, Taming the Leviathan: Post Colonial Trauma and Constitutionalism in
Kenya (on file with author).
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the people of Kenya have "the inherent power to constitute and
reconstitute their state and government."' '
The court rejected the Attorney General's claim that the con-
stitution conferred on Parliament the power to adopt the new
constitution and in part observed that the questions involved were
'larger than the Constitution itself."'10 Relying on an earlier related
case,"' Njoya v. Attorney General,"2 the court held that the
constituent power resided in the people of Kenya and as such, "by
virtue of their sovereignty," they had "the power to constitute or
reconstitute the framework of government" by making or remaking
the constitution."3 Parliament had no such power, the court held."'
The real issue in the Njoya case was on what legal title the court
would affirm the authority of the unelected and unrepresentative
National Constitutional Conference to draft a new constitution, even
if it was eventually to be approved by the people in a referendum.
In Njoya, Justice Ringera predicated his decision not only on a
principled basis of legitimate authorship, but also, as he said, on
"the colossal amount of time and resources expended on the process
so far and the fact that all shades of political opinion and various
social formations and interests had seats there.""' In other words,
the legal validity of constitutional drafting by the National Consti-
tutional Conference-as opposed to a constituent assembly, which
the court suggested would have been more representative -was not
founded on the purity of constitutional authorship by the people." 6
Rather, according to the court, the fact that the people would
ultimately approve the constitution in a referendum was contem-
plated by the fact that the existing constitution recognized that
sovereignty resided in the people of Kenya."7 As such, even if the
109. Onyango, (2005) eKLR at 12.
110. Id. at 21.
111. See id. at 8-9.
112. (2004) 1 K.L.R. 261 (Kenya).
113. Onyango, (2005) eKLR at 26 (quoting Njoya, (2004) 1 K.L.R. at 296).
114. See id.
115. Njoya, (2004) 1 K.L.R. at 284. Justice Ringera also noted that the constitution
confirmed that sovereignty arose from the people and that it was primordial. Thus the people,
Justice Ringera held, had the authority in the exercise of their constituent power in enacting
a new constitution. See id.
116. See id.; see also Onyango, (2005) eKLR at 29 (finding some uneasiness in the fact that
the National Constitutional Conference was composed of only one-third elected members).
117. See Njoya, (2004) 1 K.L.R. at 282 ("Mhe sovereignty of the people necessarily
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new constitution was drafted by a largely unelected body, the fact
that Kenya was making a constitution during peace time, unlike a
situation in which there was a "revolutionary climate or ... cease-
fire," was a primary factor to be considered in upholding the power
of the National Constitutional Conference to draft the constitu-
tion.1 '
Whereas the Njoya court was willing to look at the facts on the
ground in testing where the legal title rested for drafting and
eventually approving the constitution, those facts related as much
to popular authorship as to the political necessity of having closure
on a long, drawn out, and expensive constitution-making process.
No one, however, was asking any questions about the efficacy of the
new constitution because the people and the leaders believed it
would be binding on them, and, more importantly, because the new
constitution promised to address endemic ethnic cleavages in
national politics. 9 In other words, it appeared that the court did
not consider its role as one of assisting the political class to buy into
the constitution-making process and its product at that time.
20
Instead, the Njoya court argued the existing constitutional order
was the place to trace the locus of legal title that enabled the people
to ratify the constitution drafted by the National Constitutional
Conference, because the existing constitution recognized that
sovereignty belonged to the people.'
2
'
It is remarkable that both the Njoya and Onyango cases grounded
the bindingness of a new constitutional order on its compliance with
betokens that they have a constituent power-the power to constitute and/or reconstitute ...
their framework of government. That power is a primordial one. It is the basis of the creation
of the Constitution and it cannot therefore be conferred or granted by the Constitution.").
118. Id. at 284.
119. See Yash Pal Ghai, A New Approach Is Required To Move Forward the Review Process,
DAILY NATION (Kenya), Aug. 13, 2006 (criticizing the Njoya judgment as 'lacking merit and
based on no precedent or general practice," especially to the extent that the court did not
consider the "desirability of a referendum in a multi-ethnic state").
120. It is notable that the Njoya and Onyango decisions came soon after a major purge of
the judiciary after allegations were revealed of high level corruption among over one-third of
all the judges in the High Court and Court of Appeal. See 1 REPORT OF THE INTEGRITY AND
ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY OF KENYA (THE RINGERA REPORT) T 4:2:0
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.marsgroupkenya.org(Reports/Government/Ringera-
Report.pdf.
121. According to Justice Ringera, the new constitution could only be made "without
compromise to major principles and it must be delivered in a medium of legal purity." Njoya,
(2004) 1 K.L.R. at 285.
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the preexisting constitutional and legal order's recognition of the
sovereignty of the people, even while that order was itself widely
disapproved for legitimizing an imperial presidency and was the
subject of an overhaul in the review process.122 In essence, the courts
in these cases were proceeding from the view that Kenya's ultimate
rule of recognition for its constitutional order was based on another
rule. The courts glossed this reasoning by invoking the necessity for
political closure of the constitutional review process.'23 This
commitment to legal validity, in my view, demonstrates an overrid-
ing commitment to a Kelsenian positivism widely subscribed to in
commonwealth constitutional jurisprudence.'24 Kelsenian positivists
argue that the constitution is the grundnorm upon which the
validity of all other laws depends.'25 In its post-independence
incarnation, Kelsenian positivism was argued to prevent popular
authorship of constitutions since the principle of parliamentary
supremacy conferred on parliaments the power to amend the
constitution.'26 Such an argument gave incumbent regimes that
dominated one-party parliaments immunity from broad ranging
constitutional reform through referenda.
122. See, e.g., Ababu Namwamba, This Cannot Be a Referendum, It Is a Political Duel, AFR.
NEWS, Aug. 22, 2005 (comparing the referendum movement to being fed a spiced snake, but
being told it is a fish).
123. See generally Patrick Ouma Onyango et al. v. Att'y Gen., (2005) eKLR 1, 37 (Kenya)
(reporting counsel's assertions that the constitution-making process is a political one and the
court should not intervene); Njoya, (2004) 1 K.L.R. at 285-86 (arguing that the process of
constitutional review is "people driven").
124. As one observer noted, when confronted with the overthrow of a constitutional order,
commonwealth courts "swallowed Kelsen hook, line and sinker." S.A. de Smith, Constitutional
Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations, 7 W. ONT. L. REv. 93, 102-03 (1968); see also J.M.
Eekelaar, Principles of Revolutionary Legality, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 23
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ser. 1973). On the Kenyan case, see J.O. Rachuonyo, Kelsen's
Grundnorm in Modern Constitution-Making: The Kenya Case, in LAW AND POLITICS INAFRICA,
ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 416-30 (3d quartal 1987). Rachuonyo concludes that Kenya's
Constitution as amended until 1969 formed the grundnorm, or the source of authority, of all
other laws in the country.
125. Rachuonyo, supra note 124. See generally Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen and the
Logic of Legal Systems, 54 ALA. L. REV. 365 (2003) (discussing Kelsen's arguments that legal
interpretation concerns non-empirical norms).
126. See, e.g., Rachuonyo, supra note 124, at 416-30; see also Tayyab Mahmud,
Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup d'Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49,
53-54 (1994) (noting that "[w]hile some courts [have] adopted Kelsen's proposition that
efficacy of a coup [and constitutional order] bestows validity in an adultered form, others
modified this with or substituted it by doctrines of state necessity, implied mandate, and
public policy. Kelsen's language permeates judicial pronoucements ....").
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First, in the incarnation that Kelsenian positivism took in the
Njoya and Onyango cases, the grundnorm is now argued to allow
constitutional changes through referenda rather than exclusively
through parliaments. In both its past and present incarnations,
however, Kelsenian positivism is still wed to the idea of tracing legal
validity to the constitutional document, rather than to the facts
regarding its efficacy in relation to how the constitution informs
political behavior. In addition, the Njoya and Onyango cases
fetishized popular authorship through referenda while ignoring
recent instances in which constitutions in countries as diverse as
South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, and Afghanistan had been adopted
without referenda. The kind of positivism displayed in these cases
surrounding the question of authorship demonstrates how a focus
on authorship understates related debates about the character of
the constitutional order, such as the manner in which executive
accountability is provided for, as a condition of its legitimacy and
legal validity.
Second, the holding in the Onyango case is predicated on the view
that constitution making in a stable political environment like
Kenya, unlike in an unstable environment following a major crisis,
must not be approved expediently because it must comply with the
existing legal constitutional order. In this view, constitutions in
countries like the DRC may be adopted without regard to a prior
legal or constitutional order because existing order has broken
down, giving way to new law. The strong suggestion here is that
where a prior grundnorm has broken down, the imprimatur of the
people is not as necessary to validate the new constitution, unlike
the situation in which there is a valid existing constitutional and
legal order. This Kelsenian commitment to basing the legal validity
of a new constitutional order on a preexisting constitutional order
is narrowly legalistic, even when such a preexisting order, although
legally valid, is widely regarded as being illegitimate.
Third, Kelsenian positivism places hope that legal validity could
be derived from the revolutionary nature of a new constitution
rather than its authorship by the people, its legitimacy, or even its
efficacy. There are limitations to the manner in which Kelsenian
positivism validates new constitutions that arise from revolutionary
constitution making, rather than authorship by the people. Under
Kelsenian positivism, war like a coup d'6tat authorizes the exercise
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of political power to rebuild a society torn by conflict, in part, by
creating a new grundnorm-the new constitutional order.127 In this
respect, transition constitutions written after a war share similari-
ties with post-independence constitutions. Post-conflict constitutions
are an important part of the effort to transition from war to peace,
whereas post-independence constitutions are intended to hand over
power to post-independence rulers, thus signaling an end to colonial
rule. In both instances, however, there are striking continuities
from the past that the constitutions are intended to supersede.
For example, in Kenya the post-independence constitution
legitimized the ownership of white settler land and white settler
citizenship, thus preventing a return of the stolen lands that had
been a centerpiece of the war for independence.'28 Consequently,
the Kenyan Independence Constitution was regarded as a betrayal
of a significant nationalist demand. Similarly, the South African
constitutional experience has been argued to have forgone com-
pletely transforming the inequalities of wealth created by the
apartheid state as evidenced by the rejection of a radical program
of economic redistribution. 129 In this sense, there is continuity from
the past to the present. The question arises, however, whether such
continuity is necessary for a constitution to be efficacious, particu-
larly given that those in the political class who continue to identify
strongly with the prior constitution would be permanently alienated
under the new constitutional order. 3 ' Ultimately, a primary
function of post-conflict constitutions is to constitute a stable
governmental structure that is acceptable to the broad populace and
political class, particularly in an ethnically divided society such as
127. See Green, supra note 125, at 407-08; see also Mahmud, supra note 126, at 53-54.
128. See Gary Wasserman, The Independence Bargain: Kenya, Europeans, and the Land
Issue, 1960-1962, at 11 J. COMMONWEALTH POL. STUD. 99 (1973). After several parliamentary
amendments to the Kenyan Constitution to undo the compromises agreed to during the
negotiations with the departing British colonial government in Lancaster, the then-Attorney
General announced that the 1969 Constitution represented the will of the people and, thus,
represented a fundamental break from the past; yet this rewritten constitution reestablished
the authoritarian structure of colonial governance. See Gathii, supra note 9, at 78-83.
129. See Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63 (1997). For a more optimistic take on the potential of
using the final constitution of South Africa for a transformative project, see Karl E. Klare,
Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146 (1998).
130. See Donald Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-
Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1213 (2008).
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Kenya. An awkward and perhaps ineffective way of achieving such
post-ratification cohesion is to subject the guarantees of individual
liberty to extensive limitations and derogations in the name of
national security, public order, and public morality.'31 This was
certainly the case with the 2003 DRC Transitional Constitution. The
2005 DRC Constitution also reflects this approach to limit greatly
individual rights as a result of the ongoing war in parts of the
country.
Ultimately, the important lesson that emerges from the Kenyan
case is that questions over constitutional authorship primarily focus
on issues of process over substance. The process issues that have
been so central to constitution making in Kenya have included: (1)
whether membership to the national constitutional conference
should be elected, rather than appointed or nominated; (2) how
large or small its membership should be; (3) how representative,
inclusive, or exclusionary the Conference should be; (4) how the
process would be conducted; (5) whether the Constitutional Review
Commission could conduct civic education; (6) whether the review
process was consistent with the preexisting constitution; and (7)
whether foreign experts should be consulted. 2 The constitutional
review process in Kenya was therefore subject to several court
challenges, as well as a series of legislative interventions and ad hoc
political agreements, in order to keep it moving when there was
widespread disagreement and the threat of discontinuation by the
government was worsening by the day.
My point is not that these issues of process are secondary in the
constitution-making and drafting processes; rather, they seem to
have crowded out other equally important and equally contentious
issues-such as the character of devolution that should be adopted
in the new constitution, how to balance values of liberal equality
with those of traditional customary law, how to have a decisive but
accountable executive, and so on. Although the process of consulta-
tion and participation in drafting and enacting a constitution are
undoubtedly important,'33 the Kenyan experience demonstrates how
crucial the many contentious issues were in the arguments made in
131. See Saj6, supra note 86, at 1 (subscribing to this view of constitutions).
132. See, e.g., id. at 4.
133. See Jennifer Widner, Constitution Writing in Post-conflict Settings: An Overview, 49
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1513 (2008).
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favor of or against approving the Wako Draft in the unsuccessful
referendum of November 2005.
Notably, in the DRC the question of legal title to participate in
the political process is reflected in the Nationality Law promulgated
on November 12, 2004, which forbids non-Congolese citizens from
participating in national politics, including holding seats in the
National Assembly. This Nationality Law is a reflection of the
DRC's effort to root out from within its country foreigners with
whom the violence in the country was associated. T1 4 This law has
been associated, however, with stripping DRC citizenship of thou-
sands of Banyamulenge and others in the efforts to cleanse the DRC
of those who are perceived as sources of ethnic violence.
C. The Promise and Fate of Revolutionary Constitutionalism
Newly drafted constitutions often promise revolutionary transfor-
mations heralding a new future in which a bill of rights and limited
government will prevail over the authoritarianism and chaos of the
past. Revolutionary constitutionalism may, for example, promise
revolutionary justice where ousted authoritarian leaders are
subjected to prosecutions for their misdeeds. Yet, as we have seen
above, the promise of revolutionary constitutionalism embedded
within commonwealth jurisprudence gives little or no guidance to
the crucial questions of legitimacy, authorship, or the efficacy of the
new constitutions.135 In this section, I address yet another reason
why revolutionary constitutionalism, understood as requiring
revolutionary justice, may pose a challenge to constitution making
in post-conflict societies and constitution making in general.
Here, the experience of some Central and Eastern European
countries is instructive. In Poland and Hungary, for example, new
constitutional orders were created at a moment when the old legal
and political regimes sought to be changed were intact.136 Such a
transition allowed the preexisting regimes to agree on a new
constitutional dispensation without fearing "revolutionary justice
134. See Tom Tshibangu, Monuc Press Review, AFR. NEWS, Feb. 1, 2007.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 119-31.
136. See generally Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997).
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and revolutionary populism" should a new regime take power." 7 By
preventing the triumph of revolutionary logic, new constitutional
orders were, therefore, inaugurated with the support of groups with
significant political power. 3 ' Political agreement among adversarial
parties and the eventual adoption of a new constitution by a
legislature that had not been democratically elected in Hungary
'laid the foundations for the peaceful transition to multi-party
democracy founded on respect for human rights and the rule of law
and for the creation of a social market economy."'39
Similarly, the South African Constitutional Court rejected the
triumph of revolutionary justice in the Biko case. 4 ° Steve Biko's
family challenged the amnesty provisions enacted in the South
African transition that extended conditional amnesty to those who
confessed to having engaged in egregious human rights violations
during the apartheid era.' The South African Constitutional Court
rejected this challenge and noted that:
For a successfully negotiated transition, the terms of the
transition required not only the agreement of those victimized
by abuse but also those threatened by the transition to a
"democratic society based on freedom and equality." If the
Constitution kept alive the prospect of continuous retaliation
and revenge, the agreement of those threatened by its imple-
mentation might never have been forthcoming, and if it had, the
bridge [the Constitution] itself would have remained wobbly and
insecure, threatened by fear from some and anger from others.
It was for this reason that those who negotiated the Constitution
made a deliberate choice, preferring understanding over
vengeance, reparation over retaliation, ubuntu over victimisa-
tion.142
137. See id.
138. See Andrew Arato, Dilemmas Arising from the Power To Create Constitutions in
Eastern Europe, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 661, 674 (1993).
139. Istvan Pogany, Constitutional Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary's
Transition to Democracy, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 332, 337 (1993).
140. See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) et al. v President of Republic of S. Afr. & Others
1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trclegal/azapo.htm.
141. See id.
142. Id. 19.
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The South African and Hungarian experiences caution against a
punitive type of revolutionary constitutionalism. The drafting of the
2005 DRC Constitution seems to have been influenced by some form
of revolutionary constitutionalism to the extent that President
Kabila excluded his political opponents from the drafting process
and locked them out of the political process after the constitution
was ratified in the referendum. The 2005 DRC Constitution there-
fore arguably was tainted by the chaos of the past. In my view, the
inability of the contending groups to agree on a new constitution in
Kenya was in part informed by the lack of an agreement to prevent
the triumph of a punitive revolutionary justice. 14' The lack of such
an agreement was nevertheless guaranteed by the new Kibaki
government 2002.14' This political understanding was crucial to
allowing President Daniel Arap Moi to give up the reigns of political
power in 2002.145
Ultimately, punitive sanctions are not the only way to achieve
justice arising from prior authoritarian and rights abusive regimes.
There are now an array of examples of retributive and deterrent
responses that give victims "a more complete account of the past
and vindicate [their] accounts of their own mistreatment" that can
be used instead of revolutionary constitutionalism. 146 Both the DRC
and Kenya could learn from these alternative experiences.
CONCLUSION
Constitution making in the DRC and Kenya provides some
similarities and contrasts. Although there has been more wide-
spread debate on constitutional reform in Kenya than in the DRC,
a draft constitution in Kenya was defeated in a referendum in
143. The Task Force for the Establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
Kenya recommended the establishment of a truth commission with broad ranging powers,
which some feared would be inconsistent with the Kibaki administration's decision not to
reopen abuses of the Moi regime. For a discussion of the Task Force Report, see Mutua, supra
note 60.
144. See, e.g., Steve Mkawale & Vitalis Kimutai, Kibaki Dishes Out Another District, DAILY
NATION (Kenya), May 11, 2007 ("Meanwhile, the President has said his Government has no
intention of removing the names of his predecessor from public institutions. He said former
President Daniel Moi had done a lot for the country and could not just be wished away.").
145. See id.
146. Chandra Lekha Sriram, Transitional Justice Comes of Age: Enduring Lessons and
Challenges, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 506, 508 (2005) (book review).
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November 2005.' By contrast, a much less widely discussed
constitution was overwhelmingly approved in the DRC the same
year. 4 ' Perhaps war wariness in the DRC accounts for the over-
whelming approval of the constitution, whereas the relative
political stability in Kenya provided no similar incentive for
approving the Wako Draft. In both the DRC and Kenya, a revolu-
tionary constitutionalism that would have endorsed punitive
measures against the former regimes did not triumph, although the
fear that it would in Kenya was a factor in the debate on whether
the constitution should have been approved or rejected in the
referendum. In addition, in both the DRC and Kenya, the question
of the efficacy of the new constitutions was backgrounded by
discussions of popular authorship in Kenya and of ending the civil
war in the DRC. In Kenya, unlike in the DRC, the process of
approving a new constitution was subjected to judicial challenges
that reflected that constitution making without a major crisis may
not produce a new constitution after all. Finally, it is noteworthy
that in Kenya, the debate on reforming the constitution failed to
provide an opportunity for designing institutions that accommo-
dated its ethnic diversity. The debate on ratifying the constitution
in a referendum in particular left the country more ethnically
divided than the immediate period before. By contrast, in eastern
DRC, the continued violence-particularly the low-scale violence
that does not rise to the level of an international conflict-may have
precipitated a coming together of the people of eastern DRC in
overwhelmingly ratifying the constitution.'49 For different reasons
in Kenya and the DRC, participatory constitution making was not
crucial to the outcome. Whereas in Kenya widespread participation
and consultation resulted in voting down the constitution, in the
147. See Jillo Kadida & David Mugonyi, Mwai Kibaki Loses Kenya Referendum, AFR. NEWS,
Nov. 22, 2005 ("Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki has conceded defeat after a clear majority
voted against a new constitution in Monday's referendum. The result was a humiliation for
Kibaki who led the "Yes" campaign (Bananas) against a spirited fight from the "No" campaign
(Oranges) headed by five of his senior ministers, including Roads minister Raila Odinga ....").
148. See Congo-Kinsasha: Official Results Show Overwhelming Support for New
Constitution, AFR. NEWS, Jan. 12, 2006 ("The results reflect, in part, a firm rejection of an
appeal by veteran politician Etienne Tshisekedi, for a boycott of the process.").
149. For an excellent analysis of how low-scale local violence, though important, is ignored
by international agencies, see Severine Autesserre, Local Violence, International Indifference:
The Politics of the Peace Process in Eastern Congo (Dec. 2004) (unpublished paper, on file
with author).
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DRC minimal participation did not affect its overwhelming ap-
proval. Consequently, although participatory constitution making
may give rise to a sense of ownership of the product, it is by no
means a sine qua non to having a constitution that has efficacy on
the ground.
POSTSCRIPT
This Article was written to contrast the difficulties of constitution
making during peacetime with the case of a country facing a conflict
where constitution making is not as daunting. While the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) represented the conflict-torn country,
Kenya was the peaceful case. Since the Article was written,
however, a spate of violent ethnic cleansing gripped the country
following hotly disputed presidential elections in December 2007.
The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation talks being
mediated by a team led by Kofi Annan has outlined an agreement
between the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and President
Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) to, among other things,
undertake political reforms to address the causes of the chaos
following the elections. These reforms will include comprehensive
constitutional, legal, judicial, and electoral reforms, as well as the
establishment of a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission. 5 '
These reforms were not undertaken prior to the 2007 elections but
if these reforms are legislated, Kenya, like the DRC, will show once
again how a crisis can spark comprehensive reforms that were
difficult during peacetime.
150. See Kofi Annan, Fmr. U.N. Sec'y-Gen., Speech at the Serena Hotel Describing the
Progress of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Talks: What We Have Agreed On
So Far (Feb. 16, 2008), available at http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nngcon
tententry.asp?category-id=1&newsid=116958.
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